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ABSTRACT 
Two main semantical pproaches to possibilistic reasoning with classical propositions 
have been proposed in the literature. Namely, Dubois-Prade's approach known as 
possibilistic logic, whose semantics is based on a preference ordering in the set of 
possible worlds, and Ruspini's approach that we redefine and call similarity logic, which 
relies on the notion of similarity or resemblance between worlds. In this article we put 
into relation both approaches, and it is shown that the monotonic fragment of 
possibilistic logic can be semantically embedded into similarity logic. Furthermore, to 
extend possibilistic reasoning to deal with fuzzy propositions, a semantical reasoning 
framework, called fuzzy truth-valued logic, is also introduced and proved to capture the 
semantics of both possibilistic and similarity logics. 
KEYWORDS:  Possibilistic reasoning, possibilistic logic, similarity logic, fuzzy 
truth-valued logic 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Two main  semant ica l  approaches  to possibi l ist ic reason ing  with classical 
propos i t ions  have been  proposed  in the l i terature.  The  first one,  a prefer -  
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ence-based approach, has been proposed by Dubois, Prade, and colleagues 
in a wide series of works since the middle 1980s (see for instance [1, 2] for 
basic surveys), and the second one, a similarity-based approach, by Ruspini 
in [3] and [4]. Although with different motivation, both approaches share 
the goal of showing that the nature of incompleteness that possibilistic 
reasoning tries to capture departs from that captured by probabilistic 
reasoning or evidential reasoning. At the semantical level, the main 
difference between Dubois-Prade's and Ruspini's approaches is the follow- 
ing one: 
• In Dubois-Prade's approach, known as possibilistic logic (PL), the 
incomplete description of a system state is done by means of a fuzzy 
set of possible worlds, or equivalently by a possibility distribution on 
the set of possible worlds, which induces a linear preordering on 
possible worlds, usually read as a preference ordering among possible 
complete descriptions. 
• In Ruspini's approach, which we shall call similarity logic (SL), incom- 
pleteness in the description of a system state is modeled by means of a 
similarity relation on the set of possible worlds, together with the set 
of possible worlds that are compatible with the evidence, the so-called 
evidential set. In this way, the nature of possibilistic reasoning is based 
on metric notions rather than on preference notions. 
Nevertheless, both approaches can be put into relation as soon as a 
correspondence b tween preference and similarity relations is established 
in both directions. A first correspondence will be based on a non-standard 
notion of fuzzy set (with non-functional connectives) as defined in [5] in 
terms of a primitive similarity relation. These fuzzy sets, interpreted as 
possibility distributions, will be taken as input models in the Dubois-Prade's 
approach. On the other direction, Valverde's representation theorem of 
T-similarity relations 1 [6] provides a tool to build a T-similarity relation 
corresponding to each possibility distribution. The similarity relation ob- 
tained in this way provides the resemblance degree of each pair of worlds 
taking only into account he extent o which they are preferred according 
to a given possibility distribution. 
On the other hand, the authors have proposed in [7] a semantical 
reasoning framework as an extension of possibilistic reasoning to deal with 
fuzzy propositions. Following this line, we introduce in this study what we 
call fuzzy truth-valued logic (FTL) where, as in PL, incompleteness is 
modeled as a fuzzy set of possible worlds, but it differs from PL in that 
FTL allows each possible world to be described by a many-valued interpre- 
tation of a set of logical formulas, instead of by a classical Boolean one. 
1Called T-indistinguishability relations in Valverde's paper. 
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Therefore, it seems interesting to study the above two approaches to 
possibilistic reasoning from the point of view of FTL. 
The article is organized as follows. In the second section the basic 
notions of Dubois-Prade's and Ruspini's approaches are presented. More- 
over, Ruspini's major constructs are reformulated from the measure theo- 
retic and fuzzy sets points of view. These reformulations allow a further 
understanding of this approach. The third section is devoted to study in 
detail the above mentioned correspondences between the two approaches. 
We prove that Ruspini's approach subsumes Dubois-Prade's in the follow- 
ing sense: for each PL sentence and PL model, there exists an SL 
sentence and an SL model such that the PL model satisfies the PL 
sentence if, and only if, the corresponding SL model satisfies the corre- 
sponding SL sentence. In the last part of section 3, the relationship 
between the inference mechanisms provided by both approaches are 
studied. Section 4 presents FTL and establishes the links between PL and 
SL with FTL, and it is shown that FTL properly generalizes both. Finally, 
for interested readers, we provide a first annex summarizing the main 
results on T-similarity relations and its generators, and a second one giving 
a characterization for the subclass of SL models that correspond to the 
class of PL models. 
Throughout this study we shall use the following notation conventions: 
• L will denote a propositional language. 
• W will denote a set of classical interpretations of L, and W* a set of 
many-valued interpretations of L on the unit interval [0, 1]. 2 
• For any w c W and for any proposition p ~ L, w ~ p will denote 
that p is true in the interpretation w, and [p] will denote the set 
{w ~ W I w ~ p} of models where the proposition p is true. 
• T will denote a continuous t-norm, and R r the residuated implication 
generated by T, i.e. the implication function defined as Rr(x,  y) = 
Sup{c ~ [0, 1]1 T(x, c) < y}. 
2. TWO APPROACHES TO POSSIBILISTIC REASONING 
2.1. Preference Relation on Possible Worlds: Dubois-Prade's Possibilistic 
Logic 
The approach developed by Dubois, Prade, and colleagues ince the 
1980s [2, 8-10] has as its basic feature the representation of incomplete 
2In a general case, the unit interval [0, 1] could be replaced by an arbitrary complete and 
bounded lattice. 
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information about the real state of affairs (evidence) by means of a 
possibility distribution ~r : W ~ [0, 1], on the set W of possible interpreta- 
tions (possible worlds) w.r.t, a propositional language L. This distribution 
is usually read as a total preference ordering among worlds: w I is pre- 
ferred to w 2 if 7r(w l) >__ zr(ws). Each possibility distribution ~- induces a 
dual pair of possibility and necessity measures on the Boolean algebra of 
propositions L, defined as 
Pos~, Nec~ : L ~ [0, 1] 
Pos~(p) = Sup{zr(w) I w ~ p} Neck(p) = 1 - Pos~( -7 p) 
It is easy to check that these functions satisfy the axioms of possibility and 
necessity measures, i.e. the following conditions hold: 
1) Pos~(T) = Nec,~(T) = 1, and Pos~(±) = Neck(±) = 0, being T a 
tautology and & an anti-tautology 
2) Pos~ and Nec~ are monotone w.r.t, the lattice ordering: p < q iff 
-TpVq=T 
3) Pos#(p V q) = max(Pos#(p),Pos#(q)) and Nec~(p A q) = 
min(Nec#(p), Neck(q)) 
Further well-known properties of such measures are that Pos#(p) < 1 
implies Neck(p) = 0, and Neck(p) > 0 implies Pos#(p) = 1. Therefore, 
the graded uncertainty of a proposition p can range from Pos~(p) = 0 (p 
is false) to Neck(p) = 1 (p is true), corresponding the case Pos~(p) = 1 
and Neck(p) = 0 to the total ignorance about the truth or falsity of p. 
Such measures are the basis of the so-called possibilistic logic (PL), a 
weighted logic of uncertainty that handles possibility and necessity-valued 
formulas of classical ogic. Possibilistic logic has been widely developed by 
its authors from many points of view and with many interesting features. 
Among them, the most remarkable ones are its deductive machinery [11] 
and its ability to cope with partial inconsistency [10] and non-monotonic 
inference patterns [9, 12]. However, because of the scope of this study, we 
will restrict ourselves to the monotonic propositional fragment of this 
logic, whose basic characteristics are given below. 
LANGUAGE Given the Boolean algebra of propositions L, the extended 
possibilistic language LeL is defined as 
LpL = {(p, Ha) ,  (p,  Na)  Ip ~L ,  a ~ [0, 1]} 
PL formulas of type (p, Ha)  are called possibility-valued formulas, Ha  
standing for a lower bound of the possibility degree of p, whereas PL 
formulas of type (p, Na)  are called necessity-valued formulas where Not 
stands for a lower bound of the necessity degree of p. 
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SEMANTICS A model is a possibility distribution zr on W. The satisfaction 
relation for possibilistic formulas is defined as: 
7r ~PL (P, II a ) if, and only if, Pos~ (p) > a 
~" ~PL (P, N a ) if, and only if, Nec, (p) > a 
INFERENCE Inference in possibilistic logic is mainly based on the gener- 
alization of the resolution principle to possibilistic lauses 
(p V q, v 1) 
(-~p Vr,  u 2) 
(q V r, u 1 @ U2) 
where the commutative operation ® is defined by 
Na ® N[3 = Nmin(a,  ~), 
Ha ® I1/3 = II0, and 
Na®i i /3= {I1/3, i fa+/3>l  
II0, ifa+/3___ 1" 
It is worth pointing out that a proof procedure of refutation by resolution 
has been extended to PL, and soundness and completeness results for this 
procedure have been proved for necessity-valued formulas (see [10] for 
further elated results). 
2.2. Similarity Relation on Possible Worlds: Ruspini's Semantical 
Foundations of Fuzzy Logic 
Ruspini's approach [3] to possibilistic reasoning isbased on the introduc- 
tion of a weighted binary relation S in a set of possible worlds W valued 
on [0, 1]. This relation assigns to every pair of possible worlds a similarity 
degree evaluated from the viewpoint of the particular problem being 
considered. In order to capture the intuitive notion of similarity, the 
function S is required to fulfill the following three properties: 
Reflexivity: S(w, w) = 1 
Symmetry: S(w, w') = S(w', w) 
T-transitivity: S(w, w') > T(S(w, w"), S(w", w')) 
being T a continuous t-norm. To be closer to Ruspini's denotation, 
throughout this article such relations will be called T-similarity relations, 
although they are also known in the literature as T-indistinguishability 
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relations (see Annex A for further details). For the sake of simplicity, S is 
required to fulfil S(w, w') = 1 iff w --- w'. 
The a-cuts of the similarity function S define a family of nested 
accessibility relations R~ on the set of possible worlds W: 
R~(w,w') if, and only if, S(w, w') > a 
For every a ~ [0, 1], the accessibility relation R~ defines a Brouwerian 
Modal Logic with possibility and necessity modal operators A and V~ 
respectively: 
w ~ A~p, if and only if, there exists a world w' such that 
S(w, w') > a andw' ~p 
w ~ V~ p, if and only if, for every world w' such that 
S(w, w') > a it holds w' ~p 
Having defined a similarity relation S on W, Ruspini generalizes the 
semantical entailment relationships between propositions in terms of a 
measure of neighborhood of some sets of possible worlds by defining the 
so-called degree of implication and the so-called degree of consistency as 
I(p I q )  = Infw,~q SuPw~ pS(w, w') 
C( p I q) = Supw,~q Supw~ p S(w, w') 
respectively. These measures can also be expressed in terms of the above 
modal systems as next proposition shows. 
PROPOSITION 1 l (p  I q) -- Sup{a ~ [0, 1] I q ~ A~p} and C(p I q) = 
Sup{a ~ [0, 1] I q ~ V,~ -~ p}. 
Proof We will prove only the first equality, the second is analogous. 
The proof is in two steps. 
(i) Suppose a < I (p I q). By definition of I (p I q), this implies that, for 
every w' such that w' ~ q, Supw~pS(w , w')> a, and therefore 
there exists w" such that w" ~ p and S(w", w') >_ a. Thus we have 
proved that q ~ A p. 
(ii) Suppose now a > I (p I q). This implies that there exists w' such 
that w' ~ q and that for every w" satisfying w" ~ p, S(w', w") < a. 
This simply means that w' g: A p, and thus q g: A~p. 
Therefore, from (i) and (ii), the first equality holds. • 
Further interesting properties of C and I are that the inequality 
C(p I q) > I(p I q) always holds, and that the degree of consistency C is a 
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symmetric measure whereas the degree of implication I is not. However, 
this latter measure keeps the T-transitivity property of the similarity S, i.e., 
I(p I q) > T(I(p I r), I(rlq)) for any propositions p, q, and r. 
Information about a system state is modeled in this framework by an 
evidential set E of possible worlds, i.e., the set of worlds that are compati- 
ble with the evidence. Given such an evidential set E, Ruspini introduces 
what he calls unconditioned and conditional possibility and necessity distri- 
butions, although these constructs have a meaning that does not totally 
agree with the standard one. 
1) Unconditioned distributions 
If E is an evidential set, then functions Nec(.) and Pos(.) over 
propositions are called unconditioned necessity and possibility distri- 
butions respectively for E if 
Nec(p) < I(p I E) 
Pos(p) > C(p I E) 3 
2) Conditional distributions 
If E is an evidential set, then functions Nec(. I.) and Pos(. I.) over 
pairs of propositions are called conditional necessity and possibility 
distributions respectively for E if 
Nec(p I q) < Infw ~ e{Rr(I(q I w), I(p I w))} 
Pos(p I q) - Supw~e{Rr(I(q I w), I (p I w))} 
3) Generalized Modus Ponens 
Ruspini defines a partition as a set of propositions P = {qi I i ~ I} 
such that, for every w ~ E there exists qi E P with I(qi I w) = 1. 
For a given partition P, and based on the above definitions of 
possibility and necessity distributions, the following expressions of 
the Zadeh's generalized modus ponens are proposed by Ruspini. 
i) for necessity functions: if every qi ~ P, 
Nec(qi) < I(qi l E) and 
Nec(p I qi) ~ Infw~E{Rr(I(qi l w), I(p I w))}, 
3Although l(p I E) and C(p I E) have not been formally defined (E is not a proposition), 
they can be easily defined by extension as l(plE)=Infw,~eSupw~pS(w', w), and 
C(p I E)  = Supw,~ e Supw~ p S(w', w). 
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then the following inequality holds 
Supi ~ t{T(Nec(qi), Nec(p I qi))} < I (p  I E) 
ii) for possibility functions: if for every qi E P, 
Pos(qi) > C(q i lE )  and 
Pos(p r qi) > Supw~e{Rr(I(qi l w), I (p  I w))}, 
then the following inequality also holds 
Supi ~ l{ T( Pos( qi), Pos( p I qi))} > C( p I E) 
In order to allow for a clearer comparison with the other approaches 
considered here, we reformulate in the rest of this section the above 
Ruspini's main constructs both from a measure theoretic (subsection 
2.2.1.) and from a fuzzy sets theory (subsection 2.2.2.) points of view. 
2.2.1. IMPLICATION AND CONSISTENCY MEASURES Given a similarity 
relation S and an evidential set E, we introduce the pair of unconditioned 
measures I , e and Cs,E 4 on L by defining: 
Is,E(p) = Infw, ~ E Supw~ pS(w, w') 
CS,E( p) = SUPw, ~ E Supw~ pS(w, w') 
These measures, as Ruspini points out, are lower and upper bounds of the 
resemblance degrees between worlds in [p] and worlds in E, from the 
point of view of E. The value of Is,e(p) provides the measure of what 
extent p can be considered certain w.r.t, the incomplete knowledge repre- 
sented by S and E. In particular, if Is,e(p) = 1 then E ~ p. On the other 
hand, the value of Cs,E(p) provides the measure of what extent p can be 
considered compatible with the available knowledge. In particular, if 
Cs,e(p) = 1 then E ~: --1 p. Observe that when the evidential set is a 
singleton both measures coincide, i.e., Is,w(p) = Cs,w(p) for any world w 
and any proposition p. It is worth also noticing that Cs, e is in fact a 
possibility measure, whereas Is, e is not a necessity measure, because in 
general only the inequality Is,e( p A q) < min(Is,e(p) , Is,e(q)) holds. Next 
proposition shows which inequalities relate both measures Cs. e and Is, e. 
4These measures correspond to those denoted by Ruspini as I(. I E) and C(. J E) respectively. 
Possibilistic Reasoning 319 
PROPOSITION 2 For any proposition p, the following inequalities hold: 
Cs.E(p) >__ Is,E(p) > 1 -Cs,e(-~ p) 
Cs,e(p) > 1 - Is,e(~ p) > 1 -- Cs,e(~ p) 
Proof The inequality Cs,e(p) > Is,e(p) follows by definition. To prove 
the other inequality, observe that S(w, w) = 1 for any world w. Therefore, 
for any world w' it holds that Supw ~ p S(w, w') + Sup~ ~ ~ p S(w, w') > 1. 
Hence, Is,e(p) = Infw,~e SuPw~l, S(w, w') > Infw,~E(1 - Supw~ ~p S(w, 
w')) = 1 - Cs,e(-~ P). • 
This proposition helps in the understanding of what implication and 
consistency degrees are. Namely, Is,e(p) = 0 means that -~p is fully 
compatible with the incomplete information (Cs,e(-1 p) = 1), and Cs,E(p) 
-- 0 means that -7 p is certain (Is,e( ~ p) = 1). Moreover, the case Is,E(p) 
= 0 and Cs,e(p) = 1 means that both p and -~ p are totally unknown. 
Next we define the pair of conditional measures I ,e(. [ .) and Cs,e(. I .) as 
follows: 
IS,E( p I q) = Infw~ e{Rr( Is,w(q), Is,w( p))} 
Cs,E( p l q) = Supw ~ e{Rr(Cs,w(q), Cs,w( P))} ~ 
Notice that in particular, when q = -1- is a tautology, i.e. when [q] = W, 
then we recover the previous unconditioned measures: l s ,e (p l - r )= 
Is,E(p) and Cs,e( p IT) = Cs,e(p). Notice also that the degree of implica- 
tion and consistency between two propositions can be now expressed in 
terms of the new unconditioned measures as I (p lq )= ls,[ql(p) and 
C(p I q) = Cs, tql(p) respectively. 
Finally, Ruspini's expressions of the generalized modus ponens can be 
now reformulated in terms of the implication and consistency measures as 
follows. 
PROPOSITION 3 Given a proposition p and an arbitrary family of proposi- 
tions P = {qi [ i ~ I}, the following inference schemes hold: 
Is,e(qi) > ai, Vi ~ I 
Is,e(p I qi) > fli, Vi ~ I 
Is,E(P) > Supi~l T(°ti, ~i) 
Cs,E(qi) <_ oli, Vi ~ I 
Cs,E(p I qi) < fli, Vi ~ I 
Cs,e(P) <- SuPi~ T(cti, fli), 
5These measures correspond to the upper and lower bounds of Ruspini's definition of 
conditional necessity and possibility distributions respectively. 
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provided that in the second rule the requirement SuPi~iCs,E(qi)= 1 is 
satisfied. 
Proof For the first rule, a simple translation of Ruspini's proof applies, 
although P need not be a partition. For the second rule, suppose that 
Supi~ i Cs,e(qi)--- 1. Then we have the following chain of inequalities: 
Supi~ I T(°ti, ~i) >- Supi~ 1 T(Cs,E(qi), Cs,e(P I qi)) = Supi~ 1 T(Cs,E(qi), 
SuPw ~ e{Rr(Cs,w(qi), Cs,w(P))}) > SuPi ~ 1 T(Cs,e(qi), Supw ~ e Cs,w(P)) = 
SuPi~ I T(Cs,e(qi), Cs,e(P)) = T(Sup ie  1 Cs,e(qi), Cs,e(p)) = T(1, 
Cs,e(p)) = Cs,e(p). • 
These expressions generalize Ruspini's in two different points. First, the 
rule for necessity measures holds for arbitrary sets of propositions P, not 
only for partitions. This can be easily noted going through Ruspini's proof 
for that rule, so in this case we have only made this fact explicit. The 
second point is that the pre-condition required for the rule for possibility 
measures, i.e. Supi ~ 1 Cs,e(qi) = 1, is actually more general than the one 
implied by imposing P to be a partition. Namely, our condition can be 
read in the finite case as "there exists w ~ E and i ~ I such that 
Cs,w(qi) = 1," while the Ruspini's one reads "for each w ~ E there exists 
i ~ I such that Cs,w(qi)  = 1." 
2.2.2. SIMILARITIES AND FUZZY SETS Both notions of fuzzy set and of 
similarity relation can be linked. On the one hand, for instance, in [5] a 
notion of fuzzy set is introduced as a generalization of the extension of 
ill-defined or vague concepts where the membership degrees are degrees 
of similarity. More specifically, suppose that a concept A applies on a set 
of paradigmatic cases Ap = {a 1, a 2 . . . .  , a n} from a universe U. The method 
proposed by Niiniluoto states that the concept A will also apply on other 
cases if they are sufficiently similar to some of Ap. To this end, suppose 
also that a similarity measure S between elements of U is defined. Then, a 
natural generalization of the membership function for A arises by defining 
for every object x of U its partial membership degrees to A as: 
izA(x) = Sup{S(x, a i) l a i ~ Ap} 
Niiniluoto does not go further in this proposal, and neither formal defini- 
tions nor conditions on the similarity function S are given. Nevertheless, 
using this concept of fuzzy set, we are going to reinterpret he major 
constructs of Ruspini's approach next. 
First, given a similarity relation S, and following Niiniluoto's definition, 
we associate to every proposition p a fuzzy subset, denoted by/5, of the set 
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of possible worlds with the following membership function: 
#~(w) = Sup(S(w, w') I w' ~ [p]} 
This definition is related to the concept of fuzzy rough set [13]. In fact, the 
fuzzy set/5 is the fuzzy upper approximation of the classical set [p] via the 
similarity relation S. On the other hand, in terms of the generators of S 
(see Annex A),/5 is the smallest fuzzy set including the crisp set [p] that is, 
at the same time, a generator of S. 
From the previous definition it holds that /z~(w) = I (p  I w) = C(p I w), 
i.e. the membership degree of a world w to /5 is the maximum value a 
such that w ~ A p, or equivalently such that w ~ 7,, ~ p. It is also worth 
noticing that with this notion of fuzzy set, union of fuzzy sets coincides 
with the usual one, but it is not the case with intersection or complementa- 
tion. In general we only have the following relations: 
i.£(pv q) ~ (w) = Sup{S(w, w') I w' E [p v q]} = max(/z:(w),/xrT(w) ) 
tZ(pAq)~(W) = Sup{S(w,w')  I W' ~ [p A q]} < min(Iz~(w), I~(w))  
I~p) - (w)  = Sup{S(w,w' )  I w' ~ [-~p]} > 1 - ~(w)  
It is interesting to observe that, if we denote by F s the mapping from L to 
the set [0, 1] w of fuzzy sets on W assigning to each proposition p the fuzzy 
set/5, (Fs(L), v,  /x, -q ) is a Boolean algebra with operations defined as 
/5~/~=(pVq)~, /SA~=(pAq)~, -~/5=( - - lp )~ 
However, these operations are not enough to describe Ruspini's general- 
ized modus ponens. As it will be shown below, the formulation of the 
generalized modus ponens makes use of conditional statements "if p then 
q" whose associated fuzzy set, denoted by/5 ~ ~ and defined as /z# _. ~(w) 
= Rr(/~4(w), /x~(w)), does not belong necessarily to Fs(L). Notice that 
/5 ~ ~ is different from (p ~ q)~ = (--1 p v q)~.  This situation is very 
similar to that occurring in the probabilistic reasoning framework where 
conditionals statements are usually modeled by means of conditional 
probabilities and not as probabilities on material implications. 
Second, the unconditioned measures Is, e and Cs, e can be then ex- 
pressed as 
Is,e(p) = I( p I E) = Infw ~ e{/zp(w)} 
Cs,e(p) = C(p  I E) = Sup., ~ e{/zp(w)} 
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In other words, the interval [Is,E(p), Cs,e(p)] can be interpreted as the 
range of truth-values of/5, the "fuzzification" of p, when E is taken as 
reference (see Figure 1). 
This interpretation is therefore in complete accordance with the gener- 
alized Zadeh's possibility and necessity measures of the fuzzy set/5 given 
E, namely: 
IIe(/5) = Supw ~ w min( ize(w), tzp(w) = Cs,e( p) 
Ne(/5) = Infw ~ w max(1 -/~e(w),/xp(w)) = Is,e(p) 
In the standard algebra of fuzzy sets, using max-rain as union and 
intersection connectives, these two measures atisfy the characteristic 
properties of possibility and necessity measures, that is, 
IIE(A U B) = max(He(A), He(B)) and 
NE(A n B) = min(Ne(A) ,  Ne(B)). 
However, in the non-standard fuzzy sets algebra (Fs(L), ~/, ;x, -q ), these 
properties are only partially satisfied. As we have already noticed, in 
Ruspini's approach only union is defined as in standard fuzz3, set theory 
but negation and intersection are not. This is expressed now by the 
following relations: 
IIe(/5 x) ~) = max(FIE(/5), I Ie(~) and 
Ne(P A q) < min(Ne(/5), NE(q)) 
Third, given two fuzzy sets/5 and ~ we define the conditional fuzzy set 
4 ~ t5 by setting 
I~ 4.~ p(w) = Rr(  I~o(w), I~p(w)) 
This is very usual in fuzzy logic, where conditions of type "if q then p" are 
modeled by means of implication functions. Accordingly, the conditional 
1 
C(p / E) 
t(p / E) 
0 
W 
Figure 1. Graphical representation f implication and consistency measures. 
Possibilistic Reasoning 323 
measures Is,e(. I .) and Csx(. I .) can be expressed as: 
Is# p l q) = InL~ ~{ ~4_. /w)} 
Cs,e( p I q) = Sup" ~ E{/z4_~ ~(W)} 
Finally, given a set of propositions P = {qili e I} just taking into 
consideration the above relations, the corresponding expressions of Rus- 
pini's generalized modus ponens can now be formulated as follows: 
Infw~E{ Iz4,(W) }> a i 
Infw ~ e{/x4,--, ~(w)} > /3i 
Inf" ~ E{/~(W)} > Supi ~ l T(a,,/3i) 
Sup~{ ,,~,(w)} <_ ~, 
Sup" ~ ~{ ~,_~/~)} _</3, 
SuPw ~ e{/~(w)} < Supi~, T(ai, /3i) 
provided that for the second rule the condition Supi ~ t Sup,, ~ e{/z4~w)} = 
1. In particular, the simplest form these rules can take is: 
Inf'~e{/x#(w)} > a 
Infw ~ ~{ ~4 ~/w)}  >__/3 
Inf~e{IZ~(W) } > T(a,  fl) 
Supw~e{ l.t4(w) } = 1 
SuPw ¢E{ ~ ~/w)}  _< /3 
Sup. ~ ~{ ~/w)} _ 
3. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN DUBOIS-PRADE'S AND 
RUSPINI'S APPROACHES 
It is clear from last section that at first sight there is a main difference 
between both approaches at the inference level. In SL, inference is 
formulated through conditional measures, whereas in PL conditional 
statements are modeled by means of material implication. For this reason, 
we will mainly focus our study on relating both approaches at the semanti- 
cal level (subsections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3), devoting the last part of this section 
(subsection 3.4) to point out some comments on the inference machin- 
ery. To this end, and to better explicate the relationship between both 
approaches, it seems more advantageous to define model theoretically 
Ruspini's SL logic in a more formal way as follows: 
LANGUAGE Given a Boolean algebra of propositions L, the extended 
language LSL is defined as 
LSL = {(p, [a ,  /3]) lp ~ L, a ~ [0, 1], /3 e [0, 1], a < /3} 
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In a SL formula (p, [a, /3]), a stands for a lower bound for the 
implication degree of p, and /3 stands for an upper bound of the consis- 
tency degree of p. The formula (p, [a, /3 ]) expresses that p is considered 
to be true at least to the degree a and compatible at most to the degree/3 
w.r.t, an state of incomplete knowledge. 
SEMANTICS A model is a pair (S, E) modeling a state of incomplete 
knowledge, where S is a T-similarity relation on the set W of possible 
worlds or interpretations of L, and E is a subset of IV. The satisfaction 
relation is defined as: 
(S, E) ~s/~ (P, [ a,/3 ]) if, and only if, a < IS,E(p) and Cs,e(p)  <_/3 
In what follows we are going to show how some constructs of possibilistic 
logic can be described within the Ruspini's similarity approach, and vice 
versa. 
3.1. Mapping SL into PL 
The idea of mapping SL models into PL models is to take as possibility 
distributions those induced by the "fuzzification" of the evidential sets via 
a similarity relation, using the approach of Niiniluoto. More formally, 
given a SL model (S, E), we consider the fuzzy subset /~ of W defined as: 
I .~(w) = Sup{S(w, w')  I w' ~ E} 
The possibility distribution ~'s,E induced on W by/~, that is, ~rs,E(W) ---- 
/zg(W) for every w of IV, will be then used as the basis for defining a 
possibilistic logic semantics on top of the same propositional language L. 
Namely, the possibility distribution ~rs, e generates, in the usual way, a pair 
of dual possibility/necessity measures on propositions of L: 
POS~s,e(p) = Sup{Trs,e(w) I w ~ p} 
Nec~s.e(p) = 1 - POS~sx( -7 p)  
It is worth noticing the coincidence between degrees of possibility in 7rs, E 
and degrees of unconditioned consistency in (S, E). 
PROPOSITION 4 For every proposition p, it holds POS~s,E(p) = Cs,E(p). 
Proof POS~s.E( p)  = Sup{Trs,e(w) I w ~ p} = Supw, ~ e Supw ~ p S(w, w') 
= Cs ,E(p) .  • 
However no relation can be established between degrees of necessity 
and degrees of implication, mainly because Ruspini's measures on a 
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proposition p do not relate at all with the measures on the negated 
proposition ~ p. Therefore, the links we can establish between satisfaction 
relations for corresponding models of both approaches are those given in 
the following theorem. 
THEOREM 1 For any model (S, E) the following properties hold: 
i) If (S,E)~st.  (P, [a, /3]) then 7rs, E ~pL(~p,  N1_/3) and 
rrs,E ~t,t~ (P, II~) 
ii) If 7rs, E ~PL (P, N.) then (S ,E )~sc  (-~P, [0, 1 -  a]) and 
(S, E) ~sL (P, [a, 1]) 
Proof 
i) If (S, E) ~ (p, [a, /3]), then by definition Is,e(p) > a and 
Cs e(P) </3, but from the above remark we have Pos,~ (p) - 
Cs'e(P) > Is e(P) > a and Nec~ (--1 p) = 1 - C s e(P) :~'~1 - ft. 
' . ' S ,  , - -  
Thus it follows that rrs, e ~ (p, I I~  and 7rs, E ~ (- .p,  Nl_a). 
ii) If ~rs, E ~ (p, N~) then 1 - Cse(~ p) = Nec~.sE(p) >_ a, and thus 
(S,E) ~ (~p,  [0, 1 - a]). On'the other hand'it is Is,e(p) > _ -  
Cs,E(~ p) = Nec,~s,e(p) > a, and thus we also have (S, E) ~ (p, 
[a, 1]). • 
3.2. Mapping PL and SL 
To express PL constructs in terms of SL, we need first of all a 
procedure to obtain a similarity relation from a possibility distribution. 
This problem can be considered as a particular case of the following fuzzy 
clustering problem (see for instance [14] or [15]). Let U be a set of objects 
and A a set of attributes, and let ha(x) the extent o which the proposition 
"the object x has attribute a" is considered to be true. The problem then 
is how to get a fuzzy classification (induced by a T-similarity relation) on 
the set U with respect o the set of attributes A. More concretely, the 
matter is how to define a T-similarity relation on U given a family {ha} a ~ A 
of fuzzy subsets, each one modeling how a particular attribute applies on 
the objects of U. The solution is given by the following Valverde's 
representation theorem of T-similarity relations in [6]. 
THEOREM 2 A binary function S, mapping pairs of objects from a 
universe U into [0, 1], is a T-similarity relation if, and only if, there exists a 
family H of fuzzy subsets of U such that 
S(w, w') = Infh ~ n(min(Rr(h(w), h(w')), Rr(h(w'),  h(w)))} 
for all w and w' in U. Each fuzzy subset h ~ H is said to be a generator of 
S. 
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Notice that, if we consider the T-similarities generated by each h ~ H, 
i.e., Sh(W , w') = min(Rr(h(w),  h(w')), Rr(h(w') ,  h(w))), the above theo- 
rem says that S = lnfh c t4 Sh, and obviously it is S h > S, for every genera- 
tor h of S (see Annex A for further details). 
Thus, given a possibilistic model ~-, i.e. a possibility distribution 7r:W 
-~ [0, 1] on the set of possible worlds, the T-similarity relation that 
measures resemblance of worlds only from the point of view of rr is, 
according to the representation theorem, the T-similarity S~ generated by 
7r and defined as 
S~(w, w')  = Min(RT(1r(w),  rr(w')) ,  R r ( I r (w ' )  , 7r(w))) 
On the other hand, it seems natural to consider the evidential set associ- 
ated to 7r to be the set of worlds fully compatible or maximally preferred 
w.r.t. 7r, i.e., E= = Core(It) = {w ~ W I Tr(W) = 1}. Choosing in this way 
the evidential set, the following proposition holds. 
PROPOSITION 5 Let ~r be a possibility distribution on W. Take S,, to be 
the T-similarity relation defined above and E,~ = Core(Tr). Then the fol- 
lowing properties hold: 
(i) 7rs . ,e"  = ~r. 
(ii) Is,.e (p)  = Cs.,e (p)  
Proof 
(i) ~rs,,E (w)  = 
(ii) Cs..e (p )  = 
Is.,e (p )  = 
= Pos=(p), for every proposition p. 
Sup{S~(w, w')  I w' ~ E,~} 
Sup{MIN( Rr (  Tr(w), 7r(w')), 
RT~(~r(w') , 7r(w))) I w' ~ E~} 
Min(R~(~r(w),  1), Rr(1,  7r(w))) = zr(w). 
C( p I E.,) = Sup~,~ E~ SUpw ~ p S.~(w, w')  
Sup~,~ E. Sup~ ~ p Min(Rr(Tr(w),  ~r(w')), 
Rr(Tr(w' )  , 7r (w))) 
Supw= p Min( Rr(Tr(w),  1), Rr(1, 7r(w))) 
Supw ~ p ~r(w) = Pos,,(p). 
I(  p I E,,) = Infw,~ E" Supw~ p S,~(w, w')  
Infw,~ ~ Sup~ ~ p Min(Rr(Tr(w),  7r(w')), 
Rr(Tr(w' )  , ~r(w))) 
Supw~p Min(Rr (z r (w)  , 1), Rr(1 , rr(w))) 
Sup~ ~ p ~r(w) = Pos,,( p) .  = • 
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The equality (i) states that we recover the original possibility distribution 
~" from the similarity S~ and any evidential set E,~ associated to w itself. 
Equalities (ii) show that the implication and consistency degrees induced 
by (S~, E~) coincide, and are equal to the possibility degree induced by 7r. 
This is a direct consequence of making indistinguishable, through S~, all 
the elements of Core(Tr). Another consequence of the latter is that the 
membership function of/3, /.~(w) = Sup{S~(w, w ' ) lw '  ~ [p]}, has con- 
stant value Pos~(p) for any w ~ Core(Tr) (see Figure 2). Finally, notice 
that the proposition would still be valid if we take as evidential set not the 
whole Core(Tr) but a subset of it. 
As a direct consequence of the last proposition, ext theorem shows how 
PL can be embedded in SL. 
THEOREM 3 For any PL model 7r, the following equivalencies hold: 
i) 7r ~PL (P, Ha)  if, and only if, (S~, E~) ~SL (P, [a, 1]) 
ii) 7r ~PL (P, Na) if, and only if, (S~, E~) ~SL (-~P, [0, 1 -- a]) 
iii) 1r~pL( p, Ha)  and 7r~pL (~ p, N1- /3 )  /f, and only if, 
(S,r, E~ ~sL (P, [a, /31). 
Figure 3 summarizes results of the previous and present subsections on 
relating semantics of PL and SL. In this picture, the plain arrow from PL 
to SL stands for the faithful semantical embedding of PL into SL given by 
the equivalencies on top of the arrow. The dashed arrow from SL to PL 
stands for the partial embedding from the SL fragment of SL formulas of 
type (p, [0, a ]) into the PL fragment of necessity-valued formulas given by 
the equivalence below the arrow. Besides, a weaker additional relation 
involving arbitrary SL formulas and possibility-valued PL formulas is also 
provided. 
3.3. Closing Relations Between PL and SL Models 
In the previous subsections we have been concerned with correspon- 
dences from SL to PL models and vice versa. Now we are interested in 
•p 7£ l] °-- 
P°sn~ ) f i . . . . . . . .  "¢ I 
p En W 
Figure 2. Representation f a fuzzy proposition/~ built from a crisp proposition p
and the possibility distribution w. The dashed line represents the membership 
function /z~(w) = Sup{S~(w, ') I w' ~ [p]}. 
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~-  (p,l-la) ¢:~ (Sn, En) ~ (p, [a, 1]) 
xl= (p, Na) ¢=~ (Sn, En) ~ (-,p, [0, 1--ct]) 
POSSIBILISTIC LOGIC [ ~ SIMILARITY LOGIC 
n I,, (p, Na)/ff  Ne% (p) > a ] (S, E) I= (p, [a, ~])/ff 
n ~. (p, Ha)/ff posn (p) > a .~_ [Is,E(P), CS.E(P)] c [a, [~l 
(S, E) ~ (p, [0, ct]) ¢=~ ~S,E ~ (-np, NI-o 0 
(S, E) ~ (p, [a, [3]) ~ nS,E ~ (P' Ha) 
Figure 3. Semantical relationships between PL and SL. 
how they relate one each other. To this end, denote by F the mapping 
from SL to PL models defined in subsection 3.2., i.e. 
F(S,  E)  = 7rs, e 
and denote by G the mapping from PL to SL models defined in subsec- 
tion 3.3., i.e. 
G(Tr) = (S~, Core(Tr)) 
In Annex A, it is shown that 7rs, e is itself a generator of the similarity 
relation S, and therefore the similarity S=s.~ generated by ~rs, e is always 
greater or equal than S for any E. This property, together with property (i) 
of Proposition 5, enables us to give the following theorem describing the 
properties of the compositions of mappings F and G, where the relation 
> in the set of SL models is defined as 
(S, E)  > (S' ,  E ' )  ifaef S > S' and E ~ E'. 
THEOREM 4 I f  IdsL and IdeL denote the identity mapping on the sets of 
SL and PL models respectively, then the mappings F and G satisfy the 
following properties.6 
(i) GoF >_ IdsL and FoG = IdeL , 
(ii) GoF is a closure operator on SL models, and a model (S, E) is 
closed w.r.t, this operator if, and only if, S is the unidimensional 
similarity relation generated by Ors. e and E = Core(ors,E). 
In Annex B, a characterization of closed similarity models is fully 
described. Moreover, it is shown that, if T is an archimedian t-norm and 
(S, E) is a closed similarity model, the preference preorder of its corre- 
sponding possibilistic model and the preorder defined by any generator of 
6A pair (F, G) satisfying (i) is known as a Galois Connection. 
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the T-similarity relation S are either the same or one the inverse of the 
other. 
Finally it is easy to check that, although GoF > Ids~., the consistency 
degree is always preserved by this transformation, that is, Cs,E(P)= 
CGoF(S,e)(p) holds for every p. 
3.4. Relating Inference Mechanisms 
To study the relationship between the inference mechanisms proposed 
in PL and SL it is necessary to start out from two considerations: 
• PL uses an extended resolution principle as a general inference rule. 
• The modus ponens rule proposed for SL cannot be considered as a 
proper inference rule because it relies on the use of measures of 
conditional statements that do not belong to the language defined 
above. 
So, to relate the inference mechanisms provided by both logics we need 
1) either to define a resolution scheme in SL, or 
2) to consider how conditioning is performed in PL. 
With respect o the first point, because of Cs, e is a possibility measure but 
Is, e is not a necessity measure, the only resolution-like inference rule that 
can be formulated in SL is that corresponding to the dual form of the 
resolution principle in PL for necessity-valued clauses. Taking into ac- 
count that a necessity-valued formula (p, Na)  corresponds to the SL 
formula (-7 p, [0, a ]), the following inference scheme is valid in SL: 
(p  A q, [0, a])  
( -~p/x  r, [0,/3]) 
(q A r, [0, max( ol, /3 )]) 
As far as conditioning is concerned, two further facts have to be taken into 
consideration: 
• The notion of conditional possibility measure H(q I p) has been de- 
fined by Dubois and Prade [9] as the least specific solution of the 
equation I I (p A q) = T(I I(qlp),  H(p)), being T a t-norm. Such 
measure is thus defined as II(q I p) = RT(II(p), I I (p A q)). For in- 
stance 
1, if I I (p  /x q) = I I (p)  
l-Imin(q Ip)  = 
I I (p  /x q), otherwise 
1, if I I (p  /x q) = I I (p)  
Ilprod(q I p)  = I I (p  A q) 
~-(p)  , otherwise 
where T = minimum and T = product respectively. 
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• The consistency measure Cs,e(. I .) of conditioned statements used in 
the modus ponens-like inference mechanism in SL is not a condi- 
tional possibility measure in the above sense because, in general, only 
the inequality 
Cs,e( p A q) < T(Cs,E( q Ip), Cs,E(P)). 
is satisfied. In spite of that, for every q, Cs,E(. I q) is indeed a 
possibility measure in the sense of PL. 
Therefore it seems difficult to define in PL an inference mechanism 
corresponding to the Ruspini's modus ponens-like inference mechanism in 
SL, mainly because the conditional measures used by Ruspini are not 
conditional measures in PL. 
4. DEALING WITH FUZZY PROPOSITIONS 
The main difference in dealing with fuzzy propositions with respect o 
non-fuzzy propositions is to consider a possible world as a many-valued 
interpretation i stead of a classical interpretation. That is, fuzzy proposi- 
tions are allowed to be valued with intermediate degrees of truth. The set 
of possible worlds or many-valued interpretations (not necessarily truth- 
functional) will be denoted by W*. For the sake of simplicity we will 
consider the unit interval [0, 1] as the set of truth-values, identifying 0 and 
1 with the classical truth-values false and true respectively. As a matter of 
fact, the set of "classical" possible worlds W, i.e. the set of interpretations 
on the binary set {0, 1}, is a proper subset of W*. In this setting, given a 
proposition p, we generalize the concept of set of p-worlds [p] to the 
concept of sets of a-p-worlds, for every a ~ [0, 1], defining [p]~ = [w 
W* I w(p) = a]. So the key idea to extend possibilistic reasoning to cope 
with fuzzy propositions i to consider W* instead of W, and to consider 
classical measures on sets of a-p-worlds. 
Dubois, Lang, and Prade have proposed two other approaches [1, 8, 10, 
11] to cope with fuzzy propositions in the framework of possibilistic logic. 
In [8, 10], a fuzzy proposition p with membership function ~p is modeled 
by means of a family of necessity-valued formulas {(p,, a a) I a ~ U} where 
U is the universe of discourse for p (it would correspond to W in our case) 
and o~ a is the necessity degree of Pa generated from the possibility 
distribution ~-= ~p. In [1, 11], the resolution principle with necessity- 
valued clauses of PL has been extended to the case when fuzzy proposi- 
tional variables are involved, using the concept of generalized necessity 
and possibility measures for fuzzy propositions (see section 2.2.2.). In this 
approach, a formula (p, Na) corresponds to a possibility distribution 
7r?,~(w) = max(1 - a, /.tp(W)). 
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4.1. Fuzzy Truth-valued Logic 
Let L denote a logical propositional language, consisting of classical 
well-formed formulas, and W* the set of many-valued interpretations on 
L. Many-valued interpretations will be considered as functions w:L  --+ 
[0, 1] that assign a truth-degree to every proposition such that at least 
preserves the classical properties on {0, 1}. 
Every [0, 1]-valued interpretation will correspond to a complete descrip- 
tion of the real state of a system to be reasoned about. Then, every 
proposition p can be identified with a fuzzy subset [p]* of possible worlds 
having as membership function /*Ep1* : W* ~ [0, 1] defined by /,tpl.(W) = 
w(p), for all w ~ W*. 
As in possibilistic logic, the incomplete available information about a 
system state is modeled by means of a possibility distribution rr on the set 
W* of possible worlds, that is, 7r : W* ~ [0, 1]. Under such information, 
the (fuzzy) set of possible truth-values (together with their possibility 
degrees) for any proposition p is estimated by the so-called inverse 
truth-functional modification rp/~ (see [16]), i.e., given a proposition p and 
a possibility distribution rr, the function rp/~: [0, 1] ~ [0, 1] is defined as: 
.%~(z) = Sup~w,{~(w) I ~tpr(w)  = z}, 
which turns to be equivalent o 
rp/~(z) = Sup~w,{Tr(w)  I w ~ [p]~} = Pos~([p]z), 
that is, for each z, rp/~(z) can be understood as the possibility measure of 
the set of z-p-worlds. In other words rp/~, known as the fuzzy truth-value 
of p given rr, provides a (possibility) measure for each horizontal cut of 
the membership function /,p. This differs from [8] in that measures are 
provided there for a family of non-fuzzy propositions associated to p, 
corresponding in some sense to vertical cuts of /Zp. On the other hand, 
FTL is related with the approach of [1] in the sense that a certainty 
qualified formula (p, Na)  corresponds to the FTL formula (p, r,,), where 
r~(z) = max(1 - a, z). 
An earlier semantical formalization of fuzzy logic as a fuzzy truth-valued 
logic was given in [7]. We now define the language and the semantics of 
the fuzzy truth-valued logic FTL as follows: 
LANGUAGE Given a propositional language L, the extended language 
LFr L of FTL is defined by the set of formulas 
LFT L = {(p, r )  I p ~ L, r is a fuzzy truth value on [0, 1], i.e. r ~ [0, 1] t°al} 
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propositions and fuzzy 
SEMANTICS A model is a possibility distribution r on W*. The satisfac- 
tion relation between models and FTL-formulas is defined for every model 
r and every FTL-formula (p, r 1 as: 
r brrL (p, T) if, and only if, TV,,, I r 
4.2. Relating PL and SL to FTL 
Possibilistic logic can be interpreted in terms of the fuzzy truth-valued 
logic (FTL) in different ways. The most direct way to do it is to consider 
only classical propositions or, in other words, to consider as the set of 
possible worlds not the whole W* but only the subset of classical interpre- 
tations W. This can be easily achieved by extending any possibility distribu- 
tions r on W to a possibility distribution on W*, written also r, in such a 
way that it makes impossible all the worlds of W* - W, i.e., r(w) = 0 if 
w E W* - W. Therefore, from now on, we will use the same symbol to 
denote, without distinction, both a possibility distribution on W and its 
extension to W*. In this context, given a possibility distribution r on W, 
and considering the parametric family Q of fuzzy truth-values 
i 
ifx=O 
7,$(X) = ;: ifx=l , 
0, otherwise 
for all (Y, p E [0, 11, possibility and necessity values are related to these 
fuzzy truth-values as follows. 
PROPOSITION 6 Let 7~ : W + [0, 11 be a possibility distribution. Then the 
following conditions hold: 
i) Pus,(p) = 1 and Net,(p) = (Y if, and only if, rp,,, = r1_,,1,7 
ii) Pas,(p) = a and Net,(p) = 0 if, and only if, rp,?r = rl,u. 
Proof By definition we have r-,r(z) = Pos,([p],). Since W is the set 
of classical interpretations, [pll = {W E W I w t= p}, [p], = {w E W I w b 
-lp}u(W*- WI, and [pl, = j3 for 0 <z < 1. Therefore rp,,,(l) = 
Pm,(p), T~,,,(O> = Pos,,( 7 p> = 1 - Net,(p), and T~,,,(z> = Pm,(B) = 0 
for 0 < z < 1. As a consequence, (i) and (ii) follow directly. W 
‘This result already appears in [l, 111 corresponding to the particular case of the fuzzy 
truth-value TV related to the possibilistic formula (p, Na) (see section 4.1.) when p is a crisp 
proposition. 
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Notice that, from the above properties, it holds that 
Neck(p) > a if, and only if, .Cp/~ <_ .c 1 _ 4,1 
Pos~(p) > ~ if, and only if, -rp/~ > ~1,4 
Therefore, the semantical entailment in PL of necessity-valued formulas 
has a direct translation into FTL as it is expressed in the following 
theorem. 
THEOREM 5 Let 1r : W --* [0, 1] be a possibility distribution. Then the 
following equivalence holds: 
7r ~PL (P, Na) if, and only if, 7r ~FrL (P, "rl- 4,1)" 
Notice that, using the interpretation of possibility and necessity values as 
fuzzy truth-values given in proposition 6, the semantical entailment of PL 
possibility-valued formulas does not have a direct translation into FTL. 
However, taking into account hat PL semantics can be embedded in SL 
semantics (see section 3.2.), we will see how that translation will be 
possible after first having faithfully translated any SL semantical entail- 
ment to a corresponding one in FTL. 
Given a T-similarity relation S on W, we define a function fs : W ~ W* 
mapping each classical world w to its corresponding many-valued world 
fs(W), defined by fs(w)(p) = Supw, ~ p S(w, w'), for all p ~ L. 8 Now, given 
a SL model (S, E), we build its corresponding FTL model by considering 
the possibility distribution ~rs, E : W* ~ [0, 1] defined by: 
1, i f3w ~E suchthat w* =fs(W) 
Vw* ~ W*, ~rs,E(w*) = 0, otherwise 
Considering these particular kind of FTL models it is easy to prove that, 
from the semantical point of view, FTL logic embeds SL logic. 
THEOREM 6 For any SL model (S, E) and for any SL sentence (p, [a, 
/3 ]) the following equivalence holds: 
(S, E) ~SL (P, [a ,  /3]) if, and only if, ~rs, e ~FrL (P, r4,~), 
where r4, ~ is the fuzzy truth-value defined as 
1, if ~<x< /3 
K~,O (x) = O, otherwise 
8Notice that fs(w) is not necessarily a functional many-valued interpretation. 
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Proof Let us compute rp/~s.E. By definition zp/~s.~(z) = Sup{Crs,e(w*) I 
w* ~ W*, w*(p) = z}, and therefore ither ~-_/, (z) = 1, if there exists 
, s,E S(w, w ' )=z ,  or w ~ E such that w* =fs(W) and fs(w)(p)= Supw,=p 
Zp/~s,~(z) = 0 otherwise. Thus, if Zp/~s.~(z)= 1 then necessarily z
[Is,E(p), Cs,e(p)]. Moreover, the interval [Is,e(p), Cs,E(p)] is the smallest 
closed interval including the set {z ~ [0, 1] I ~'p/,~.E(z) = 1}. Now suppose 
that (S, E) ~sL (P, [or, /3]) holds. Then {z ~ [0, 1]1 Zp/;,s,~(z) = 1} c 
[Is,E(P), Cs,e(P)] c [a, /3]. Therefore zp/~s ~ <_ K~,t3. Reciprocally, if 
~'p/~,E < r~,t3 then {z ~ [0,1] I ~'p/~,e(z) = 1} ~ [a, /3], and therefore we 
also have [ Is,e(p), Cs,e(p)] c [or,/3]. • 
Finally, this result, together with Theorem 3, where SL is proved to 
capture PL, leads directly to the following corollary showing how FTL 
captures PL as well. 
COROLLARY For any PL model 7r and any PL sentences (p, Ha)  and 
(p, Not) the following equivalence holds: 
i) 7r~t, L (p, Hot) iff (S,~, E,~) ~Sl~ (P, [a, 1]) iff Cr s e, ~FrL (P, r~,l) 
ii) 1r ~eL (P, Na) iff (S,~, E=)~s/~ (~P, (1), 1 -  a]) iff 
~'gS~,E~r ~FTL ( " P, K0,1-~)- 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have established semantical relationships between the two main 
approaches to possibilistic reasoning, Dubois-Prade's approach known as 
possibilistic logic and Ruspini's approach whose formalization we have 
called similarity logic. We have also proposed an extension of PL to deal 
with vague propositions called fuzzy truth-valued logic that has been 
related to the previous two approaches. The main semantical links among 
these logics can be summarized in Figure 4. In the scheme of this figure, 
plain arrows stand for faithful semantical embeddings of logics, whereas 
the dashed arrow stands for the partial embedding of PL into FTL, more 
concretely, of the PL fragment of necessity-valued formulas into FTL. 
However, notice again that a faithful semantical embedding of PL into 
FTL can be obtained by composing the two plain arrows, according to the 
previous corollary. Due to the two possible paths from PL to FTL (only 
for necessity-valued formulas), it is interesting to remark that ¢r ~e/~ (P, 
Na), ¢rs.,e ~ ~rrL (-Tp, K0,1_a) and q'g~FTL (P, zl-~,l) are all of them 
equivalent expressions. In addition, the study contains ome other rela- 
tions from SL to PL and from FTL to PL or SL, but all of them are 
partial--they are not embeddings. 
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~ (p, l-la) ¢~ (s~, E~) ~ (p, [a, 11) 
x~ (p, Na) ¢:~ (S~,F-n) ~(~/~ lO, l--al) 
POSSIBILISTIC LOGIC ~ ] SIMILARITY LOGIC 
I= (p, Na) iff Nec n (p) >- a . [ (S, E) I~ (p, [or, Ill)/ff 
~ (p, Ha) iff Pos n (p) -> a \ / [ [Is,E(p), CS,E(p)] c [a, 131 
\ / I \ \ 
\ 
n~ (P'Na) ~ n ~ (P' xi-aA ) p, l-lot) ¢~ ? \ \ \ \ \  / (S, E) ~ (p, [a, ~]) ** ~S,E ~ (P' ~)  
'I 
FUZZY TRUTH-VALUED LOGIC 
Figure 4. Semantical relationships among PL, SL, and FTL. 
As concluding remarks and for future work it is interesting to point out 
the following: 
First, in subsection 2.2.2., the main constructs of Ruspini's approach 
have been redefined from the point of view of fuzzy sets. Given a similarity 
model (S, E) the consistency and implication degrees of a classical propo- 
sition p have been obtained as the supremum and infimum over the 
evidential set E of the membership function of/3, the "fuzzification" of 
the set of p-worlds [p]. In this approach consistency is a possibility 
measure in the sense of Dubois and Prade but implication is not a 
necessity measure. On the other hand, in [13] the notion of fuzzy rough set 
has been introduced as pair of lower and upper approximations of a 
original fuzzy set with respect o T-similarity relation. In this context, the 
fuzzification fi of a classical proposition p is the upper approximation of 
the rough fuzzy set defined from [p] with respect to the T-similarity 
relation S. Therefore, there exists another possible "fuzzification" of p 
with respect o S given by the lower approximation p defined as tXp(W) = 
lnfw, ~ E(1 - S(w, w')). Then, analogous correspondifig definitions of impli- 
cation and consistency measures can be defined from p, and it is easy to 
see that in this case implication is a necessity measure in the sense of 
Dubois-Prade but consistency is not a possibility measure. In this way, we 
could define a "dual" similarity logic where PL could also be embedded. 
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The second remark concerns to the inference mechanisms of PL, SL, 
and FTL. As we pointed out in subsection 3.4., resolution in PL can be 
translated in a dual form into SL. But it seems most interesting to study 
the notion of conditional proposition in both approaches. Ruspini gives as 
inference mechanism the generalized modus ponens, using conditional 
consistency and implication measures but his definitions do not coincide 
with the notion of conditional measures in PL. On the other hand, 
inference in FTL has not been addressed too. Therefore it remains for 
future work to further study relationships at inference level, as well as to 
identify the possible different kinds of conditional objects behind all these 
approaches, in the line studied in [2]. 
ANNEX A: ON T-SIMILARITY RELATIONS AND ITS 
GENERATORS 
From a general point of view, the problem of distinguishability has been 
always considered as a basic notion to build any theory. Roughly speaking, 
the problem is to find a binary relation representing a general notion of 
indistinguishability between elements of a set of objects. It seems reason- 
able that this kind of relations should be reflexive and symmetric but not 
transitive as it was cleverly pointed out by Pointcare. In the literature, 
different notions of nontransitive indistinguishability relations have been 
proposed. For example, Menger in [17] defined the notion of probabilistic 
relation that assigns to every pair of elements of a probabilistic space the 
probability of these elements to be indistinguishable. But it is in the frame 
of fuzzy relations where the notion of indistinguishability has been mainly 
developed. Zadeh initiated the studies of such domain defining the so-called 
similarity relations [18]. He proved that similarity relations are associated 
in a natural way to partition trees and, by duality, to ultrametrics as well. 
Ruspini, in the frame of clustering problems [14], defined a notion of 
likeness relation. But it was Trillas [19, 20] who gave a general definition of 
a T-indistinguishability relation related to a t-norm T, which contains as 
particular cases all previous definitions. 
Given a t-norm T and a set X, a fuzzy relation S : X × X ~ [0, 1] is said 
to be a T-indistinguishability relation if the following conditions hold: 
i) For every x of X, S(x, x) = 1 (Reflexivity) 
ii) For every x, y of X, S(x, y) = S(y, x) (Symmetry) 
iii) For every x, y, z of X, T(S(x, y), S(y, z)) _< S(x, z) (T-Transitivity) 
This definition contains all previous definitions as particular cases. The 
probabilistic relation of Menger is obtained taking the t-norm T as the 
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product operator, i.e. T(x, y)= xy, the Zadeh's similarity relation is 
obtained taking T as the minimum operator, i.e. T(x, y) = min(x, y), and 
the Ruspini's likeness relation is obtained taking T as the t-norm of 
Lukasiewicz, i.e. T(x, y) = max(O, x + y - 1). For simplicity reasons, and 
following the denotation used by Ruspini in [3], from now on, all these 
kinds of relations will be referred to as T-similarity relations. 
As usual, every T-similarity relation on a finite set is given by a matrix 
whose elements are the values S(x, y). As usual also, the t-norm T used in 
a specific application depends on the context of the application. In his 
study about the semantics of fuzzy logic, Ruspini uses the general defini- 
tion of T-similarity relation and particularizes to the t-norm of Lukasiewicz 
in some examples, but all the results in Ruspini's and in this study are valid 
for any t-norm, unless explicit indication is made. 
A procedure to obtain a T-similarity relation from a family of fuzzy sets 
is given by the Valverde's representation theorem [6], already introduced 
in section 3.2., but we repeat it here in order for this annex to be 
self-contained. 
THEOREM Let T be a continuous t-norm. A fuzzy relation S on a set X is 
a T-similarity relation if, and only if, there exists a family H = {hy}j ~ j of 
fuzzy subsets of X such that 
S(x, y) = Infy~j(min( Rr(hy(x), hi(Y)), Rr(hj( y), hi(x)))) 
for all x, y of X and being R r the residuated implication defined by T. 
In other words, this theorem says that the T-similarity relation gener- 
ated by a family H of fuzzy sets is S = In f j~ Sj(x, y), where Sj(x, 
y) = Min(Rr(hy(x), hi(y)), Rr(hj(y), hi(x))), that is, S is the infimum of 
the T-similarity relations Sy : X × X ~ [0, 1] generated by each fuzzy set 
hj of H. In the frame of clustering problems, this has been interpreted as 
follows. Let X be a set of objects and let A be a set of attributes uch that 
for every attribute a of A there exists a fuzzy set h a : X ~ [0, 1] assigning 
to every element x of X the degree of applicability of the attribute a to 
the element x. Then, for every attribute a, the fuzzy set h a generates a 
T-similarity relation Sa, being Sa(x, y) the similarity degree between 
objects x and y with respect only to the attribute a. Finally, the T-similar- 
ity relation S defined by S(x, y )= Infa~A Sa(x, y) gives the similarity 
degrees between elements of X with respect o the whole set of attributes 
A. 
From the above representation theorem, a notion of what a generator of 
a T-similarity relation is has been introduced and studied in [15] and [21]. 
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DEFINITION A function h : X -o [0, 1] is said to be a generator of a 
T-similarity relation S if the T-similarity relation S h generated by h is greater 
or equal to S. Moreover, a family of functions {h i [ i ~ I} is said to be a 
generating family of S if for every x, y of X, S(x, y) = Infi ~ ~ Si(x, y). 
Obviously, if F is a generating family of S, and G is a family of 
generators of S, then F U G is also a generating family of S. The 
following proposition characterizes the set of generators of a given T- 
similarity relation. 
PROPOSITION For every T-similarity relation S on X, let ~s be the 
mapping qb s : [0, 1] x ~ [0, 1] x defined by dPs(h)(x) = Supy ~ x{T(S(x,  y), 
h(y))}. If H s denotes the set of generators of S, then H s = '}s([0, 1]x), 
that is, the mapping h : X -~ [0, 1] is a generator of S if, and only if, there 
exists a function f :  X -} [0, 1] such that OPs(f) = h. 
The following examples are useful: 
1) Any constant function is a generator of any T-similarity relation S. 
Proof If K is the constant mapping K(x)  -- k for every x of X, being 
k a fixed number of [0, 1], a simple computation shows that OPs(K) = K, 
for every T-similarity relation S. The result is obvious as the T-similarity 
relation generated by K is St(x ,  y) = 1 for every x, y of X. • 
2) For every element a of X, the function ha : X ~ [0, 1] defined by 
ha(x) = S(a, x)- - the corresponding column of the matrix of S- - is  a 
generator of S. 
Proof For every a of X, let fa be the characteristic function of the 
singleton {a}, that is, 
1, i f x  =a  
fa(X) = 0, i fx4=a 
A simple computation shows that OPs(fa) = h a, and so h a is a generator of 
S. Hence, if X is finite, every column of the matrix S(x, y) is a generator 
of S. • 
3) For every subset E of X and every T-similarity relation S on X, the 
possibility distribution ~rs,e, defined as 7rs,E(x) = Supy~ e S(x, y), is 
a generator of S. 
Proof Let fE be the characteristic function of the set E, that is, 
1, i f x~E 
re(x)  = O, otherwise 
As in the previous cases, it is easy to check that ~s( fe )  = 7rs,E and hence 
Its, e is a generator of S. • 
T-similarity relations generated by one function, i.e., those that have a 
generating family with only one element, are said to be unidimensional nd 
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play an important role in this work. A first interesting property of a 
unidimensional T-similarity S is that if f and g are generators such that 
{a If(a) = 1} = {a I g(a) = 1}, then necessarily f = g. A characterization 
of unidimensional T-similarity relations uch that S(x, y) ~ 0 for every x 
and y, is given in [21] for archimedian t-norms. A t-norm T is archimedian 
if T(x, x) < x for any x of the open unit interval (0, 1). 
THEOREM I f  T is an archimedian t-norm, a T-similarity relation S on X, 
satisfying S( x, y) ~ 0 for every x and y of X, is unidimensional if, and only 
if, there exists a total order in X (<)  with first and last elements, denoted by 
a and b respectively, such that for every x, y, and z of X with a < x < y < z 
< b, then T(S(x, y), S(y, z)) = S(x, z) > O. 
For a better understanding of this proposition we need the notion of 
what a betweenness relation is. A ternary relation B c XxXr.X is a Be- 
tweenness relation [22] if (x, y, z) ~ B implies that: 
1. x~y~z~x 
2 . (z ,y ,x )~B 
3. (y, z, x) ~ B and (z, x, y) ~ B 
4. if (x, z, t) ~ B then (x, y, t) ~ B and (y, z, t) ~ B 
In such a case we say that y is between x and z. Two interesting examples 
of betweenness relations are the following ones. In these examples it is 
assumed x :~ y ~ z ~: x. 
A) Given a mapping h:X  ~ [0, 1], we can define the following be- 
tweenness relation: 
y is between x and z if x <~hY <<-h Z or z ~h x ~hY, (a) 
where --<h is the total preorder in X generated by h, i.e. x <bY iff 
h(x) <_ h(y). 
B) Given a T-similarity relation S on X, where T is archimedian, the 
following betweenness relation can be properly defined: 
y is between x and z if T(S(x ,  y), S(y,  z))  = S(x,  z) > 0 (b) 
Having in mind these examples, the above theorem says that, if T is an 
archimedian t-norm, a T-similarity relation S is unidimensional if, and 
only if, the betweenness relation (b) generated by S and the betweenness 
relation (a) generated by any generator h of S are the same. Moreover, 
noticing that any pre-order and its dual generates the same betweenness 
relation, we can say that if S is unidimensional, the total preorderings 
defined by any two different generators of S must be either the same or 
one is the dual of the other. 
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It is worth noticing that this result is not true in general for non- 
archimedian t-norms, as the following example shows. Take T = rain, 
X={x,  y, z} and let h and g be the fuzzy sets on X defined by 
h(x) = g(x) = 1/3, h(y) = g(z) = 1 and h(z) = g(y) = 1/2. A simple 
computation shows that the T-similarities generated by h and g are the 
same but the betweenness relations defined by the preorders associated to 
h and g are different. Moreover, the relation (b) defined above is not, in 
general, a betweenness relation when T is not archimedian. For instance, 
take the min-similarity relation S generated by a function h:X  ~ [0, 1] 
such that there exist x, y, and z, three different elements of X, with 
h(x) < h(y) < h(z). Then, it is easy to check that 
Min(S(x, y), S(y, z)) = S(x, z) and Min(S(x, z), S(z, y)) = S(x, y) 
This would mean that, on the one hand, y should be between x and z, and 
the other hand z should be between x and y, being y 4: z. This situation 
prevents the relation (b) to be a betweenness relation in this particular 
case. 
ANNEX B: CHARACTERIZATION OF CLOSED SIMILARITY 
MODELS 
In section 3, the relation between similarity and possibilistic models has 
been studied. In subsection 3.3., the mapping F from SL to PL models 
and the mapping G from PL to SL models have been defined and proved 
that FoG = IdeL and GoF > IdsL. The question is now to characterize the 
SL models (S, E) such that GoF(S, E) = (S, E), that is, to describe the set 
of the closed SL models by the closure operator GoF. The following 
lemma is needed to prove a characterization theorem for closed similarity 
models which is the main result of this section. 
LEMMA For any t-norm T, if x < y < z, then RT(RT(Z, y), RT(Z, 
X)) = RT(Y, X). 
Proof Paalman de Miranda's representation theorem of t-norms [23] 
postulates that, given a t-norm T, there exists a family of disjoint intervals 
{(ai, bi) I i ~ I} and a corresponding family {f/ l i  ~ I} of continuous and 
strictly decreasing functions f/:[ai,  bi] --9 [0, + oo] with fi(bi) = 0 such that 
[f/[ -ll(f~(x) +f/(y)) ,  i fx ,  y~ [ai, b i ] fo rsomei~I  T(x, y) = [ Min(x, y), otherwise 
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Here, f/t- 11 is the so-called pseudo-inverse of f, and defined as 
ai, 
fi [- l ](x ) = ~fi [- 1](X) = f/- I (X) ,  
I f / I - l l (x)  b i, 
if x<0 
if x ~ [0, f(ai)] 
if x > f(ai). 
As a consequence, the corresponding residuated implication R r generated 
by T can be expressed as 
Rr(x ,y  )= - l l ( f / (y )_ f i (x ) )  ' i f x>yandx ,  y~[a i ,  bil 
otherwise. 
Taking this representation i to account, four different cases have to be 
considered to prove the lemma: 
1. x, y, and z belong to some interval [ai, bi] of the family defined by T. 
In such a case, Rr(Rr(z  , y), Rr(z, x))=fi[-1](fi(fi[-l l(f i(x)- 
f/(z))) - f/(f/[- ll(fi(y) - f/(z)))) = f/I- 1](f/(x) - fi(Y)) = Rr(Y, x). 
2. z and y belong to a same interval [ai, bi] but x does not. In this case, 
since Rr(z, y )>y,  Rr(z, y) and x cannot belong to the same 
interval, and thus, Rr(Rr(z,  y), Rr(z, x)) = Rr(Rr(z,  y), x) = x = 
Rr(y, x). 
3. x and y belong to a same interval [a~, b i] but z does not. In this case, 
Rr(z, y )=y and Rr(z, x )=x,  and thus Rr(Rr(z,  y), Rr(z, 
x)) = Rr(Y, x). 
4. x, y, and z belong to three different intervals. In this last case, we 
have that Rr(z, y) = y, Rr(z, x) = x and Rr(y, x) = x, and there- 
fore x = Rr(y, x) = Rr(Rr(z,  y), Rr(z, x)). 
Therefore the lemma is proved. • 
THEOREM Let T be a t-norm and let S be a T-similarity relation on a set 
of worlds W. A similarity model (S, E) is closed if, and only if, S is 
unidimensional nd there exists a generator h of S such that E = {w ~ W I 
h(w) = M} being M the maximum value of the image set h(W). 
Proof Suppose that S is generated by a function h:W ~ [0, 1] and 
E = {w ~ W Ih(w) = M}, being M = Max{h(w) I w ~ W}. In this case, 
the T-similarity relation S is defined as 
1, if h(x) = h(y) 
S(x, y) = Rr(h(x),  h(y)), if h(x) > h(y) 
Rr(h(y),  h(x)), if h(x) < h(y). 
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On the other hand, given the similarity model (S, E), the possibility 
distribution Zrs. e = F(S, E) reduces to 
1, i fw~E 
~'s,E(w) = Rr(M,  h(w)),  if w ~ E. 
Observe here that if M = 1, it must be necessarily h = 71"s, E. Now, it is 
easy to prove that the T-similarity relation S=s.~ generated by 7rs, e is equal 
to S: 
• if h(w) = h(w') then Irs,e(w) = 7rs,e(w') and so, S~s.e(w, w') = S(w, 
w')= 1. 
• if M > h(w) > h(w') then, applying the result of the previous lemma, 
it is evident that S= (w, w ' )= Rr(Tr s E(w), 1r s e(w' ) )= Rr(RT(M,  
S,E  , , 
h(w)), RT(M, h(w'))) = Rr(h(w), h(w')) = S(w, w'). 
Moreover, since Rr(x,  y) < 1 iff x > y, it is easy to see that ~rs,e(w) = 1 
iff w ~ E, that is, Core(Trs, e) = E and thus G(F(S, E)) = (S, E). There- 
fore (S, E) is a closed similarity model. 
The reciprocal of the theorem is evident because if (S, E) is a dosed 
similarity model, then G(Trs, e) = (S, E), and thus ~rs, E generates S, and 
E = Core(Trs, E) = {w I ~rS,E(W) = 1}. Therefore the theorem is proved. • 
COROLLARY I f  (S, E) is a closed similarity model, then Its, e is the only 
normalized possibility distribution on W that generates S. 
For archimedian t-norms, taking into account he characterization theo- 
rem of unidimensional T-similarity relations (see Annex A), we can give a 
stronger characterization of closed similarity models than the above theo- 
rem. 
THEOREM Let T be an archimedian t-norm and let S be a T-similarity 
relation on a set of worlds W satisfying S(w, w') > O, for every w, w' ~ IV. 
A similarity model (S, E) is closed if, and only if, S is unidimensional nd 
for every generator h orS either E = {w ~ W I h(w) = M} orE = {w ~ W 
[ h(w) = m}, being M and m the maximum and minimum value of the 
image set h( W) respectively. 
Finally, it is interesting to notice that, as a consequence of this theorem, 
if T is an archimedian t-norm, the betweenness relation generated by the 
total preference preorder given by a possibilistic model 7r, is the same 
betweenness relation defined by the unidimensional T-similarity relation 
S,,. In the other way round, dosed similarity models are those pairs (S, E), 
where S defines the same betweenness relation than the one defined by 
the preference preorder associated to Zrs, E and E is the core of Zrs. e. 
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